A denial of the universality of logic

Abstract

We normally view logic as a tool in distinguishing correct from incorrect reasoning. The Foundationalist's notion that logical truths exist independently of human mind presumes that the system of logic is anchored on self-evident principles that are necessary, i.e. true in all possible worlds. This notion is the premise of the idea that logic is a set of indubitable truths. Hence, it is considered normative or about "how we ought to reason." The Foundationalist's notion on logic is, however, flawed. Examining the metaphysical status of logic and our epistemic relation to it leads us to the conclusion that logic does not have necessary truthfulness; and that an appeal to Foundationalism or axiomatization in logic is untenable. A proof refutes that logic is a system of logical truths which are grounded on self-evident principles. Logic does not exist independently of human mind; and the so- called self-evident principles are not self-evident at all. The universality of logic is challenged by theorizing that the system of logic is dependent on how the community of rational minds, which are of the same species in a given world, interprets and understands reality, which makes logic essentially descriptive and not just normative.