Understanding United States foreign policy towards Southeast Asia: from benign neglect to ad-hoc intervention, 1997-2009

Abstract

By the time the Second World War had reached its terminus in August 1945, the United States already had found itself inextricably linked with Southeast Asia. Through its coordinated military campaigns with other Allied Powers in the liberation of the region from Imperial Japan and its attempted management of the subsequent process of decolonization in the immediate post-war era, Washington came to identify Southeast Asia as an arena endowed with intrinsic geopolitical value and essential for US national security interests. In short, the United States underwent a change of perception with regards to Southeast Asia - from a colonial backwater of secondary importance to a key strategic front during the Cold War period. Despite the fact that Washington had a history of involvement in the region, particularly with its administration of the Philippine Islands as a territorial possession, the United States and its foreign policy agenda had changed after the Second World War. It was no longer just an emerging Western power with an isolationist bent but rather a superpower with global reach, global presence and global commitments. Accordingly, throughout the second half of the 20th century, the approach of Washington towards Southeast Asia fluctuated from direct military intrusion (Second Indochina War) to supporting cast member (Cambodian conflict) to extemporized intercession (1997-1998 East Asian Financial Crisis). Still, it must be emphasized that from 1945 onwards the region was never relegated to the margins of United States foreign policy. The focus of this paper is a case study evaluation of United States foreign policy concerning the Southeast Asian regional sub-system between the years of 1997 to 2009. To be more specific, four examples will be put forward to illustrate a particular policy and behavioral pattern Washington either has followed or exhibited towards Southeast Asia during the aforementioned timeframe. Indeed, it is the position of the authors that the foreign relations of the United States vis- à-vis the Southeast Asian zone since 1997 have been predominantly reactive and ad-hoc in dealing with regional trends and events. Furthermore, Washington clearly has revealed that it lacks a far- reaching and coherent foreign policy strategy for the region. Despite the fact that the 1997-1998 East Asian Financial Crisis and the post-9/11 Global War on Terror obligated the United States to become re-engaged with Southeast Asia more openly and purposefully, successive US presidents have displayed very little consistency in message and action towards the ASEAN community. With these historical observations in mind, the authors will propose five policy recommendations that would allow the Obama White House to reconstruct a new partnership with the ASEAN realm as well as to further the geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic interests of the United States across the region. The underlying premise of the paper is that the US must associate itself fully with ASEAN governments and peoples by adopting a comprehensive public diplomacy campaign at both the state and grassroots levels.