Economic trends in the U.S, the Soviet Union and developing Asia: implications for the balance of power

Abstract

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, the first post-war use of USSR troops outside the Warsaw Pact territory since World War II, was a shock to many Western observors. It was convincing evidence that that whenever traditional methods of international subversion combined with external military supplies do not suffice to achieve results similar to those of Vietnam, Laos, Angola and Ethopia, the Soviet Union is quite willing to use a more traditional rapid deployment of well armed troops. For the world as a whole, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is an occasion of profound regret. But like many events which cause regret, the invasion is also prompting a serious reassessment of past actions and views by many parties. The U.S. is taking a new look at the way the Soviet employs its powers and at the present relevant commitments of U.S. and Soviet conventional armament. The early findings of this reassessment are not particularly encouraging.