ASEAN and South China Sea Imbroglio: a fresh look at its approach to conflict management

Abstract

The main thrust of this paper is to look at ASEAN's approach towards the South China Sea dispute, examine its effectiveness in dealing with the irredentist claims of China, the central player in the dispute, and to evaluate the prospect of easing of tension in the region within its current policy framework. There is not one ASEAN approach to the South China Sea dispute, even though they may all be subscribing to the idea of building of confidence and engagement of China to contain the dispute and manage conflicts in the region. We would like to argue in this paper that ASEAN's policy of engagement of China and its ‘soft and accommodative approach towards the South China Sea issue has brought only temporary benefits in terms of only shelving the conflict, but it has not been very effective in managing the latter or restraining it from escalating the conflict level in the Spratlys. The way of managing China is not through display of ASEAN's own weaknesses and accommodation of former's vital interests in South China Sea but only through firm and united stand conveying a message that the ASEAN foreign ministers were able to deliver on 18 March 1995 after China's occupation of Mischief Reef came into light.