Securing the straits of Malacca: Malaysian perspectives of Japan's role and contributions

Abstract

Piracy and seaborne terrorism are major security concerns for ships plying the Straits of Malacca. The fact that sixty percent of the world's seaborne trade passes through the Straits also makes these narrow waters a happy hunting ground for pirates and an alluring target for would-be terrorist attempting to destabilize world trade. While the littoral states - Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore - had pledged to step up patrols and undertake efforts to secure the vital sea lanes of communication, it is doubtful if they have the capacities to effectively deal with these threats. It was in this context that the U.S. made overtures to deploy military assets to patrol the Straits. The Japanese Coast Guard, in the meantime, has been conducting joint exercises and training with its Southeast Asian counterparts as part of its anti-piracy initiative. However, US plans to increase the Seventh Fleet's presence in the Straits elicited negative comments from the region, putting paid to extra-regional involvement to combat piracy. This paper examines Malaysian responses to Japanese efforts to combat piracy in the Straits of Malacca. Specifically, it investigates (a) to what extent, if at all, fears of Japanese militarism and "war memories" factored in the mindsets of Malaysian elites toward accepting Japanese military presence in the Straits of Malacca to combat piracy and seaborne terrorism, (b) to determine if Malaysian elites differentiate between Japan and other foreign powers such as the U.S., Australia or Russia in security issues, and (c) to gauge the acceptance of elites on the idea of Japan participating in a multilateral maritime peacekeeping force.