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https://ptsldigital.ukm.my/jspui/handle/123456789/395029Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Tham Chuan Siong | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Chang Yu Chen | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-06-15T07:53:58Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-06-15T07:53:58Z | - |
| dc.identifier.other | ukmvital:122739 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://ptsldigital.ukm.my/jspui/handle/123456789/395029 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Vickrey auction has its comparative advantages in economic perspectives. In second price sealed-bid auction, bidders' bidding strategies are not affected by closing method. In a first-price auction, bidders always bid below their values. In year 2007, author proposed one round first price anonymous auction protocol to solve the tie problem in one round auction. This paper is to extend the one round anonymous auction protocol from first price to second price auction protocol. | - |
| dc.language.iso | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE),Piscataway, US | - |
| dc.subject | Auction protocol | - |
| dc.title | Design and analysis of one round anonymous second price auction protocol | - |
| dc.type | Seminar Papers | - |
| dc.format.pages | 4 | - |
| dc.identifier.callno | T58.5.C634 2008 kat sem j.3 | - |
| dc.contributor.conferencename | International Symposium on Information Technology | - |
| dc.coverage.conferencelocation | Kuala Lumpur Convention Centre | - |
| dc.date.conferencedate | 26/08/2008 | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Seminar Papers/ Proceedings / Kertas Kerja Seminar/ Prosiding | |
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