The strategic intentions and results of the changes of the Korean Electoral Systems

Abstract

Other things being equal, the electoral systems not only affect the incentive structure of voters and politicians (psychological-strategic effect) but also the process of converting obtained votes to parliamentary seats (mechanical effect). Taking this political effect of electoral systems in mind, politicians and parties would prefer an electoral system that favorably converts support for them into parliamentary seats, and further seek for the change to such electoral system if they are allowed to do it. At which state, then, should they try to change the electoral system? What kind of electoral system do they want? If changed, how do incentive structures of each political party change? How does a changed electoral system influence the party system? From the theorem that electoral systems promote strategic behavior of both voters and political elites, this thesis infers that those who come into power without the voluntary support of voters (e.g. coup d'etat) will pursue changes in electoral system so as to disarrange the voters' support structure toward the existing party system. In addition, change of electoral system will be sought when electoral environment comes to be disadvantageous due to decrease in voters' support to those in power, despite their efforts to stay in power. This paper aims to find evidences that prove the inferences through the analysis of changes of electoral system for Korean National Assembly. Furthermore, this thesis asserts that the fairness of the adopted system differs depending on the amending process. Whereas a certain power monopolizes the process, and an absolutely advantageous unfair system is adopted, an electoral system adopted through cooperation among a number of powers has a possibility of adopting a relatively fair electoral system.