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| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | Zaleha Abdul Shukor, Associate Professor Dr. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Masood Fooladi Chaghadari (P58119) | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-10-10T09:06:23Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-10-10T09:06:23Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2014-04-15 | |
| dc.identifier.other | ukmvital:74792 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://ptsldigital.ukm.my/jspui/handle/123456789/485832 | - |
| dc.description | A recent critical agency problem arises from the expropriation of shareholders�� wealth within emerging economies. Controlling owners have the opportunity to tunnel benefits from a firm to their related firm or directly to their accounts through self-dealing. Prior studies suggest that most expropriation of firm��s resources is conducted through the related party transactions (RPTs). Based on the conflict of interest view, related parties opportunistically use their authorities to expropriate firms�� resources for their own benefits via RPTs subsequently increasing agency costs and reduce firm value. One important monitoring system to reduce the agency problem is corporate governance (CG). CG monitors firm's performance to align the interests of those who control and those who own the residual claims in a firm. The aim of this study is to investigate the moderating effect of CG characteristics on the relationship between RPTs and firm value. This study uses ��divergence�� between cash flow and control rights as a factor that could intensify the negative effect of RPTs. Applying ��proportionate stratified random sampling��, 271 firms over the period of 2009-2011 are randomly selected from the Malaysian listed firms. This study applies a moderated multiple regression model to test the hypotheses. Findings of this study document that the interaction terms of board size, CEO duality and divergence between cash flow and control rights with RPTs have a significant negative effect on firm value. These findings suggest that board size, CEO duality and divergence between cash flow and control rights in this study sample can intensify the negative relationship between RPTs and firm value. Findings suggest that related parties having a dominance control on the board of directors can compromise the monitoring role of directors on RPTs. Findings support the necessity for more scrutiny by regulators, policy makers and standard setters to monitor the conflict of interests in RPTs and restrain the power of related parties to protect the firm��s wealth by introducing stricter regulations for RPTs and improve CG practices especially to monitor RPTs in order to limit the opportunistic behaviour of related parties.,PhD | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | UKM, Bangi | |
| dc.relation | Faculty of Economy and Management / Fakulti Ekonomi dan Pengurusan | |
| dc.rights | UKM | |
| dc.subject | Moderating effect of corporate governance | |
| dc.subject | Corporate governance | |
| dc.subject | Related party transactions | |
| dc.subject | Firm value | |
| dc.subject | Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia -- Dissertations | |
| dc.title | The moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship between related party transactions and firm value | |
| dc.type | Theses | |
| dc.format.pages | 203 | |
| Appears in Collections: | Faculty of Economy and Management / Fakulti Ekonomi dan Pengurusan | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ukmvital_74792+Source01+Source010.PDF Restricted Access | 1.81 MB | Adobe PDF |  View/Open |
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